Alan Ehrenhalt

The primary thesis of this book seems to be that Americans had a sense of well being in the 1950s and the Baby Boomers are mostly to blame for its absence today.

The belief that the ’50s were an fairly idyllic time is not simply nostalgia by those adults who lived through it. Despite the nuclear and communist threats, corrupt political bosses, lack of privacy, racial injustice, constrictive roles for women and the dictatorial rules to be found just about everywhere one went, most people felt pretty good about life. The optimism that exudes from the media of the day is tangible.

So why was everyone so damn happy? Ehrenhalt believes it was the social codes that were enforced by church, family, school and society at large that made for a more content populace. Authority, in other words, makes [most] people happy.

Say what?

The concept may sound alien to us in 2015 (or in 1995 when this book was published) but it might not be so far-fetched. In one of his stronger arguments, Ehrenhalt says that while there is always a small group of bright and articulate libertarian-minded people who wish to throw off all the chains that bind, most people are not like this. Most people prefer order and a rulebook and get nuts when they don’t have one or when others don’t follow it. The libertarian fallacy is the belief that everyone deep down wants to be like them.

In what sometimes sounds like a cranky old man telling kids to get off his lawn, Ehrenhalt lays the majority of the blame for this lost community at the feet of the Baby Boomers. It was their teeming masses, he says, that were crammed into too-small suburban houses and too-crowded schools. Was it constrictive architecture that eventually drove the Boomers to clamor so loudly about their need for “personal space” and to whip off anything that looked remotely like a shackle?

In the 1950s, privacy, choice and space were in short supply. By the time the Boomers matured, if they knew nothing else, this generation knew they wanted lots of all of these things. In their drive for abolition of rules of almost any sort, the relative calm that was known in 1950s America was seemingly swept away like a rushing river had burst through Mayberry. In its wake, today we have 25 types of toothpaste and over 300 TV channels to choose between. While this might make the libertarians among us rejoice, what about the majority of people who are intimidated by these things and prefer things to be less overwhelming?

As Ehrenhalt says: “It is not the place of the historian or social critic to mock the comforts of ordinary people.”

If the anchors that made for a more stable society will one day be restored, Ehrenhalt believes it will have to come from a future generation who are not so averse to limitations, who welcome a bit more authoritative control, who will gladly exchange a little less freedom for a far less-chaotic world.

Overall, the different areas of Chicago (Parish, Ghetto and Suburb) that are the focus of the book, are well-evoked. The book is a bit less effective at selling the arguments presented as there is little hard evidence given to support them. Nonetheless, Lost City was a thought-provoking read and is worth picking up if you ever wondered how we went from sock hops to Twitter feeds.
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The momentum of history changes once again. From the Great Migration to Urban Flight to Gentrification and something new again entirely. But Ehrenhalt says differently.

The old demographic shift was that more affluent Americans moved away from the city, in order to get away from crime, blight, and so forth. Now that the old projects have been demolished, new condos are rising, and people move back in droves. Primarily for convenience. Gas prices have a role in it.

Suburbs will yet remain as places to raise families, he says, but they will have more open-air, pedestrian-based commercial markets, to make them more appealing to those who moved out of the city in the first place.

This is happening to a surprising extent. Strollers and families are trickling into New York's Financial District. The lower classes are starting to be relegated to exterior neighborhoods of the city. Those who have money also have mobility. From the center, they can go to exterior areas as they please. For comparison, see Paris and Vienna in the late 19th century. See the Viennese Ringstrasse or the Paris arrondisements reborn, but in Chicago or Denver.

Not all cities are suited for this. Some, which never had centers to begin with, will yet struggle to create ones. See Phoenix. Others, with gutted urban centers, will struggle to attract and revitalize theirs. See Detroit. But these trends may continue, in a severely attenuated form.

Of course, it's very difficult to predict population and cities on such a large scale. Ehrenhalt, with his basis on both historical and modern economic/demographic backgrounds, may be closer than most. Of course, he gives a nod to technology and communication, and location might not even matter *as* much, as some may stay huddled in suburbia, linked to the world with our laptops. But it all remains to be seen. I'll bet with him for now.… (más)

Ehrenhalt argues that there is a tendency for upper middle class Americans to move back into city centres and similar "live/work/play" walkable communities. This is contrary to the latter half of the 20th century in which the city centres were abandoned and anyone with the financial means fled to the suburbs.
But the best part of the book is the analysis of specific communities in selected US cities. I don't know the cities in question but the author's description gives a good insight into the difficulties of resusitating downtowns or of transforming suburbia. The illustrations make it clear that there is no simple formula for urbanizing.… (más)