Mark Curtis (1) (1963–)
Autor de The Web of Deceit: Britain's Real Role in the World
Para otros autores llamados Mark Curtis, ver la página de desambiguación.
Obras de Mark Curtis
Etiquetado
Conocimiento común
- Fecha de nacimiento
- 1963
- Género
- male
- Biografía breve
- Mark Curtis is an author, consultant and journalist. He is a former Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) and Director of the World Development Movement. He has been an Honorary Research Fellow at the University of Strathclyde and Visiting Research Fellow at the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, Paris and the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik, Bonn.
Mark has written six books on British foreign policies and international development:
Secret Affairs: Britain’s Collusion with Radical Islam (Serpent’s Tail, 2012)
Unpeople: Britain’s Secret Human Rights Abuses (Vintage, 2004)
Web of Deceit: Britain’s Real Role in the World, (Vintage, 2003)
Trade for Life: Making Trade Work for Poor People (Christian Aid, 2001)
The Great Deception: Anglo-American Power and World Order (Pluto, 1998)
The Ambiguities of Power: British Foreign Policy since 1945 (Zed, 1995).
Mark has also worked in the field of international development for 20 years and manages a small consultancy that works with and supports the activities of progressive NGOs – Curtis Research. This involves writing policy reports and undertaking fieldwork in developing countries, especially Africa, on issues such as food/agriculture, mining, tax and trade. Mark is a former Head of Global Advocacy and Policy at Christian Aid and Head of Policy at ActionAid. He is a graduate of Goldsmiths’ College, University of London and the London School of Economics and Political Science.
http://markcurtis.wordpress.com/about...
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Web Of Deceit: Britain's Real Foreign Policy por Mark Curtis
Reasons that Britain is a 'rogue state', often a violator of international law and a condoner of human rights abuses, as well as a key ally of many repressive regimes. This work argues that under the Blair government, Britain has become a champion of a form of globalisation that is increasing the takeover of the global economy by big business.
The definition of diplomacy has been described as the ability to tell a person to go to hell in such a way that they look forward to the trip. When you think of a titled British ambassador, you have the image of a soft talking Sir Humphrey as a gentle ambassador for British interests abroad. Curtis has spent hours pouring over formerly secret government files released under the Thirty year rule; turns out the reality is very different from the image that they have cultivated…
From the evidence the he has amassed Curtis argues that the UK is an 'outlaw state', an ally of many repressive regimes and a frequent a violator of international law. He catalogues the shocking human rights abuses carried out by foreign countries with tacit approval of the UK government. The unpalatable details of historical events in Indonesia in 1965; Diego Garcia; Iran and British Guiana, Kenya, Malaya and Oman are covered in detail. The Uk has also supported repressive governments in, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel. This policy of having a political elite in charge of a country to control the population purely so British business and economic interests can take precedence over that particular countries wishes is abhorrent.
It makes for quite depressing reading and is a slamming indictment of the UK government and Foreign Office. Whilst this was primarily aimed at the New Labour government; who thought that inserting ethical before foreign policy would make it so. It doesn’t, if you have not changed the fundamental principles of the policy. Sadly, I cannot imagine that it is any better under the present encumbrances… It is a bit dated (I have had it sitting on my shelf for years!), but still an eye opening read.… (más)
From the evidence the he has amassed Curtis argues that the UK is an 'outlaw state', an ally of many repressive regimes and a frequent a violator of international law. He catalogues the shocking human rights abuses carried out by foreign countries with tacit approval of the UK government. The unpalatable details of historical events in Indonesia in 1965; Diego Garcia; Iran and British Guiana, Kenya, Malaya and Oman are covered in detail. The Uk has also supported repressive governments in, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel. This policy of having a political elite in charge of a country to control the population purely so British business and economic interests can take precedence over that particular countries wishes is abhorrent.
It makes for quite depressing reading and is a slamming indictment of the UK government and Foreign Office. Whilst this was primarily aimed at the New Labour government; who thought that inserting ethical before foreign policy would make it so. It doesn’t, if you have not changed the fundamental principles of the policy. Sadly, I cannot imagine that it is any better under the present encumbrances… It is a bit dated (I have had it sitting on my shelf for years!), but still an eye opening read.… (más)
This review first appeared in Anarchist Studies Vol 21 No:1 of Anarchist Studies, 2013.
Spend any time at an anti-war demonstration in England, and the view that there is a global war on Islam, or against Muslims, will be articulated. The protagonists are seen as the United States, Israel or the UK (or any combination thereof). Mark Curtis turns these conventions upside down, with a withering expose of how Britain has historically looked to work with and alongside Islam, and in particular its most conservative adherents. The settings for this approach vary – Empire, Iran under Mossadegh, Soviet-dominated Afghanistan, much of the Arab world in post-colonial
years – but the aims and practice of British foreign policy have been surprisingly consistent. These have been to develop working relationships with those in power or likely to obtain it, and to promote British and international business interests against domestic populations.
When King Abdullah of Transjordan called for a pan-Islamic movement after World War Two, the Foreign Office was supportive, on the grounds it would be a bulwark against Communism. Within a decade a clear division existed in the region between the Islamic monarchies supported by Britain (to ensure access to their oil) and nationalist regimes whose orientation was frequently leftist. Curtis makes great use of the national archives to show that British plotting with radical Shia in Iran and funding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt bore mixed results. Eventually it was to be Saudi oil money that ensured an Islamic bloc emerged to counter the nationalists (p.92).
In 1973 the world’s economic axis shifted, as the oil price quadrupled. Saudi Arabia used that wealth in two ways: the global propagation of its brand of Islam, and making serious financial investments in Western countries. By 1975 the Saudis had invested $9.3 billion here. Curtis argues ‘The upshot was that Britain was now economically reliant on the Saudi regime and would be in effect tied to aligning its foreign policy to the regime’ (p.119).
The US support for the Mujahideen in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan is a matter of record, but this book sheds new light on Britain’s role in that ill-considered escapade. The MI6 officer co-ordinating British support to the holy warriors was Alastair Crooke, based in Islamabad (p.144), and ex-SAS men were employed to train Mujahideen in Oman, Saudi Arabia and even Britain itself. Indeed, as it is Saudi Arabia and Pakistan who have been the primary sponsors of radical Sunni Islam, Curtis concludes: ‘Whitehall thus made a British contribution to the imminent emergence of global Islamist terrorism’ (p.149). Whilst the question of where this militancy would end was ignored, the Saudis made sure they kept the money flowing: from 1985 to 1988, the UK signed military contracts worth £15 billion with the Kingdom.
In the 1990s London began to become an important centre for both Arab exiles and, in time, the Arab media. Foreign Office advice was that fundamentalism was unlikely to have much appeal in the UK; something Curtis argues led to the toleration and protection of radical emigres for many years (p.174). With hindsight, this protection was astonishing: Osama Bin Laden’s two core fatwas declaring war against the West, were faxed from London in 1996 and 1998 (p.185).
And so it continues. Kosovo, Libya, Iraq – in each country Islamist actors were embraced against nationalist regimes (p.224). At times the perfidy is genuinely shocking. In 1978 the Shah of Iran was sold CS gas to put down riots, whilst talks were opened with the opposition. In 1982 a KGB defector gave MI6 details of Soviet assets inside the new Islamic Republic. MI6 and the CIA gave their names to the Ayatollahs, leading to the crushing of the left wing Tudeh party.
There are some areas Curtis does not address. Policy within the UK is broadly outside his terms of reference, yet in recent years we have seen an interesting domestic variant of the foreign policy he sketches. Here the New Labour government simultaneously gave huge sums of public money to the Quilliam Foundation (critical of many aspects of radical and conservative British Islam, and headed by several reformed Muslim ‘extremists’), whilst at the same time the Metropolitan Police’s Muslim Contact Unit purposefully worked with and empowered Salafi and Muslim
Brotherhood groups in an attempt to diminish Al Qaeda’s influence in London’s mosques. As ever, our ruling class likes to have money on both horses in the race.
What they are not however, is ‘at war’ with Islam per se, and we have Curtis’ superb historiography to thank for explaining this.
Paul Stott, University of East Anglia… (más)
Spend any time at an anti-war demonstration in England, and the view that there is a global war on Islam, or against Muslims, will be articulated. The protagonists are seen as the United States, Israel or the UK (or any combination thereof). Mark Curtis turns these conventions upside down, with a withering expose of how Britain has historically looked to work with and alongside Islam, and in particular its most conservative adherents. The settings for this approach vary – Empire, Iran under Mossadegh, Soviet-dominated Afghanistan, much of the Arab world in post-colonial
years – but the aims and practice of British foreign policy have been surprisingly consistent. These have been to develop working relationships with those in power or likely to obtain it, and to promote British and international business interests against domestic populations.
When King Abdullah of Transjordan called for a pan-Islamic movement after World War Two, the Foreign Office was supportive, on the grounds it would be a bulwark against Communism. Within a decade a clear division existed in the region between the Islamic monarchies supported by Britain (to ensure access to their oil) and nationalist regimes whose orientation was frequently leftist. Curtis makes great use of the national archives to show that British plotting with radical Shia in Iran and funding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt bore mixed results. Eventually it was to be Saudi oil money that ensured an Islamic bloc emerged to counter the nationalists (p.92).
In 1973 the world’s economic axis shifted, as the oil price quadrupled. Saudi Arabia used that wealth in two ways: the global propagation of its brand of Islam, and making serious financial investments in Western countries. By 1975 the Saudis had invested $9.3 billion here. Curtis argues ‘The upshot was that Britain was now economically reliant on the Saudi regime and would be in effect tied to aligning its foreign policy to the regime’ (p.119).
The US support for the Mujahideen in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan is a matter of record, but this book sheds new light on Britain’s role in that ill-considered escapade. The MI6 officer co-ordinating British support to the holy warriors was Alastair Crooke, based in Islamabad (p.144), and ex-SAS men were employed to train Mujahideen in Oman, Saudi Arabia and even Britain itself. Indeed, as it is Saudi Arabia and Pakistan who have been the primary sponsors of radical Sunni Islam, Curtis concludes: ‘Whitehall thus made a British contribution to the imminent emergence of global Islamist terrorism’ (p.149). Whilst the question of where this militancy would end was ignored, the Saudis made sure they kept the money flowing: from 1985 to 1988, the UK signed military contracts worth £15 billion with the Kingdom.
In the 1990s London began to become an important centre for both Arab exiles and, in time, the Arab media. Foreign Office advice was that fundamentalism was unlikely to have much appeal in the UK; something Curtis argues led to the toleration and protection of radical emigres for many years (p.174). With hindsight, this protection was astonishing: Osama Bin Laden’s two core fatwas declaring war against the West, were faxed from London in 1996 and 1998 (p.185).
And so it continues. Kosovo, Libya, Iraq – in each country Islamist actors were embraced against nationalist regimes (p.224). At times the perfidy is genuinely shocking. In 1978 the Shah of Iran was sold CS gas to put down riots, whilst talks were opened with the opposition. In 1982 a KGB defector gave MI6 details of Soviet assets inside the new Islamic Republic. MI6 and the CIA gave their names to the Ayatollahs, leading to the crushing of the left wing Tudeh party.
There are some areas Curtis does not address. Policy within the UK is broadly outside his terms of reference, yet in recent years we have seen an interesting domestic variant of the foreign policy he sketches. Here the New Labour government simultaneously gave huge sums of public money to the Quilliam Foundation (critical of many aspects of radical and conservative British Islam, and headed by several reformed Muslim ‘extremists’), whilst at the same time the Metropolitan Police’s Muslim Contact Unit purposefully worked with and empowered Salafi and Muslim
Brotherhood groups in an attempt to diminish Al Qaeda’s influence in London’s mosques. As ever, our ruling class likes to have money on both horses in the race.
What they are not however, is ‘at war’ with Islam per se, and we have Curtis’ superb historiography to thank for explaining this.
Paul Stott, University of East Anglia… (más)
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