Christopher M. Bell (1) (1974–)

My grandfather fought for New Zealand in World War 2 in the Mediterranean theatre. As I began to learn about the conflict (largely from a wonderful National Radio series tracing World War 2 events fifty years earlier broadcast each week) I gained an impression of Churchill’s role as a God like figure who had inspired Britain into a heroic fight alone against Nazi tyranny. I was therefore surprised when asking my grandfather about Churchill to learn that he was a pommy toff who callously sent New Zealanders into dangerous situations (e.g. Greece, Crete) with little hope of survival. Yet my grandfather’s brother waxed lyrical about the wonderful British Army and the genius of Churchill. This was a vivid representation of the division inspired by Churchill.
The division is unsurprising. In politics it seems that only the mediocre enjoy a lack of vitriol - although this is usually because they are forgotten altogether. Names like Alex Douglas-Home, Ramsay MacDonald and most of the Presidents of the USA in the late nineteenth century don’t arouse passions or overburden bookshelves with biographies. By contrast those who take bold action inevitably excite controversy. Not all in society benefit from dramatic changes - Margaret Thatcher, Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan have left their names in the history books for the scale of transformation during their time in power, and a legacy of debate as their legacy lives on. Clement Attlee must be one of the few transformative leaders who has largely avoided vitriol, although Churchill’s comments about his mediocrity perhaps rate a mention (or are they an explanation?).
Winston Churchill could scarcely have avoided controversy. His forceful and dynamic style, desire for action and attainment of high office at two of the most critical points in the history of the twentieth century in and of themselves made this likely. However his extraordinary awareness of his historic legacy, and literary contributions to his legend took this to another level. The number of archives and academic organisations dedicated to ongoing study of his career as well as the sheer volume of written material about him surely must only be exceeded by Hitler (and possibly Stalin).
Christopher M. Bell is a naval historian who has already written a well received history of Churchill’s naval strategy in World War II, [b:Churchill & Sea Power|13689657|Churchill & Sea Power|Christopher M. Bell|https://images.gr-assets.com/books/1387148439s/13689657.jpg|19310354]. In this book he backtracks to the important events early in World War I which were to have such a profound impact on Churchill’s career. The view that Churchill’s legacy (certainly not a legend) could be adjudged ambivalent looking back in 1939 is well justified by an examination of the events of 1915 and their aftermath. The Dardanelles put a blot on Churchill’s reputation which lasted for years, and highlights just how extraordinary his rise to power in 1940 was. Bell’s combination of an understanding of naval strategy and his attention to the politics is a valuable combination. War is a multi-layered as well as multi-theatred beast, especially a complex expansive war such as the Great War. It is insufficient in looking at Churchill’s part in the Dardanelles to look at the military history alone, or equally only at machinations in Whitehall. The strategic imperatives, the competing demands for action and the resource constraints all play their role in the decision making process.
The most recent work focussing on the Dardanelles, Tom Curran’s [b:The Grand Deception: Churchill and the Dardanelles|25283458|The Grand Deception Churchill and the Dardanelles|Tom Curran|https://images.gr-assets.com/books/1428109096s/25283458.jpg|45009948] unapologetically took the line that Churchill was a dangerous amateur who overruled his subordinates and was obsessed with conquering the Dardanelles by naval action alone. In his conclusion he even claims that without Churchill’s actions, Kitchener and the Admiralty might have planned a successful joint operation for the middle of 1915 and successfully taken Gallipoli.
In contrast with Curran’s work, Churchill and the Dardanelles provides a sophisticated history of Churchill’s involvement in the campaign. Carefully analysing the evidence Bell does not let Churchill off the hook for his faults, however provides a much more nuanced view of the campaign. He casts doubt on the school of thought that the campaign was really one of the great strategic conceptions of the war, whilst also demolishing most of the claims that Churchill concealed the reservations of the Admiralty and pushed through a foolish plan by force of personality.
The two sides of the controversy - the amateur strategist who concealed opposition to his plan, or the man with a brilliant idea to overcome the stalemate on the western front let down by poor execution - both have problems when it comes to proving them methodologically. The former line was actually developed during World War I based on gossip, selectively leaked information (including from Lord Fisher who was a cunning if erratic political ‘player’) and whose political motivation saw no issues with slandering Churchill without an evidential basis. Curran and others since have propagated the same view since through selectively using or misreading evidence, and failing to critically analyse self serving testimony at the Dardanelles Commission which reviewed the campaign in 1916/17. The latter line depends largely on the legend Churchill and his supporters developed after the war, particularly in the influential series of books [b:The World Crisis, 1911-1918|90230|The World Crisis, 1911-1918|Winston S. Churchill|https://images.gr-assets.com/books/1347989791s/90230.jpg|1397444] by Churchill which not only shaped interpretation of the campaign but also provided one of the few sources of contemporary documents until the 1960s.
The main issue with Churchill’s interpretation is that the Straits were not about to become passable even if the forts did run out of ammunition, and that he ignores the problem of mobile guns, howitzers and minefields which had not been suppressed. Bell comments that “his unwillingness to acknowledge the many obstacles to a successful resumption of the naval offensive suggests there was a strong element of self-delusion at work.” Additionally the strategic benefits were based on a pretty jaundiced view of the Ottomans as a ‘sick man’ ready to collapse from Revolution at any minute. This was a widely held view however.
I think the core aspect of Churchill's character is that at heart he was a man of action. “You can’t make omelets without breaking eggs” applies - those who are dynamic and refuse to accept the status quo will always court controversy and take risks, dealing with the unknowable future. It is easy in hindsight to argue the risk was too great, but comparing the losses on the western front with those at the Dardanelles and Gallipoli and taking into account the potential benefits of victory, it is difficult to argue that the whole campaign was completely futile. As Bell clearly points out, Churchill certainly didn’t overrule his advisers and a full (albeit flawed) plan was worked out by the Admiralty. What is much more notable is the lack of strategic direction from the Prime Minister Asquith, poor decision making processes and Kitchener’s non-consultative style. Churchill was certainly forceful and over optimistic. I found this quote illuminating: ‘You know what Winston is’, remarked Herbert Creedy, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the War Office. ‘At a conference he talks everyone else into a jelly and then goes away saying that everyone agreed with him.’ The leading British politicians and Admiralty figures certainly would need their competence questioned however if this deterred them from properly critiquing his plans and priorities. The evidence of other proposed operations such as Borkum indicates that in fact they could critique and oppose Churchill. In the case of the Dardanelles to varying extents they did support the operation.
The evidence of late 1914 and early 1915 also doesn’t support the characterisation of Churchill as an ‘Easterner’. He was only attracted to the Dardanelles operation because the initial stakes were low. Peter Hart in [b:Gallipoli|10879533|Gallipoli|Peter Hart|https://images.gr-assets.com/books/1328077493s/10879533.jpg|15795050] makes the mistake of believing that Churchill was an easterner, “sucked into the fatal trap of thinking that their project was all-important”. In fact Bell shows that the operation did not leave Admiral Jellicoe exposed in the North Sea, nor did it leave Sir John French denuded. Churchill also continued to recognise the importance of the North Sea. In fact as hindsight shows the operations in 1915 on the western front were futile. The idea of devoting resources outside of the western front was not fundamentally flawed. Bell does show though that the difficulties at the Dardanelles were underestimated (more at the professional naval level) and most importantly the escalation was not foreseen, planned adequately or coordinated effectively. Churchill played a part, but only a part, in these inadequacies.
Perhaps though the most important thing to be said about Churchill was that he had the determination and self assurance to overcome the grave doubts about his competence and judgement that existed in 1915 (rightly or wrongly) and the strength of character to position himself for high office again in 1940 in a role that has to be seen as critical to Britain prosecuting the war, standing alone following Dunkirk. If this were to be his only legacy, it would be a powerful one.… (más)

Like other reviewers, it took me a long time to complete this book. I would characterize the first five chapters as being dense and hard to get through. Too much about the costs and red tape of building the Royal Navy. That said, I thought Chapters Seven through Eleven were much more interesting and easier to read.

I would guess that there have been almost as many words written about Churchill as Lincoln. And, from the perspective of new material about Churchill's life, it would have to be specialized and narrow in scope. You do not get as good a sense of his character and importance in this book. First read a general biography or account of England and WW II. Seapower is more detailed and better for a reader interested in naval histories.… (más)

Not quite as systematic a study as I had hoped, as the book feels more like a series of case studies than an integrated whole. Still, Bell makes a strong counter-arguement to British navalists in regards to their position that Churchill was a failure in terms of maritime policy, if only by demonstrating that many of Churchill's supposed mistakes (Gallipoli, Norway, Singapore, etc.) were much more collective failures than have been presumed and proving that Churchill did try to fairly balance means and ends in his strategic calculus.

The single biggest issue might simply come down to Churchill not being interested in naval power for its own sake and being overly focused on offensive action against the main enemy, even if it could only be achieved in a secondary theater. Essentially, Bell considers Churchill's biggest error in naval affairs to have been the failure to grant more resources to the Battle of the Atlantic in 1942 in the debate over how many heavy bombers to divert to the ASW effort; a product of Churchill's blindspot in regards to strategic defense.

By the end of the book one does come to the conclusion that the likes of Stephen Roskill and Correlli Barnett essentially scapegoated Churchill for not catering to the Royal Navy's imagined perogatives as the senior service (particularly with the rise of the RAF) and that Churchill's supposed failures in naval policy are more an indication of the limits of British imperial power in global war then any particular fault of the man.… (más)