Short and lucid description of the biggest stock market crash of the 20th century, with many similarities to what is happening in 2008-2009. Which does not have to mean that the 2008-2009 (or 2001-2009) market turmoil is going to end up just as badly. ( )

In deze beschrijving van de beurs crash in 1929, niet gespeend van ironie, geeft John Kenneth Galbraith een overzicht van de gebeurtenissen voorafgaande en gedurende de beurs krach van 1929. Ook een behandeling van de nasleep in de jaren dertig en de mogelijke verklaringen hoe deze beurskrach ook de werkelijke productie economie kon beinvloeden worden geschetst.

Door ieders rol en drijfveren te benoemen wordt inzichtelijk gemaakt dat een accumulatie van onvoldoende gefundeerd vertrouwen, kortweg naieviteit, en eigenbelang vrijwel niet zonder instortingsgevaar te stoppen is. Zowel degenen die een direct belang in de beursverloop hadden, bankiers en speculanten, als zij slechts zijdelings toekeken, de politiek en procudenten bleken niet in staat de verstrengeling van belangen te doorzien en hiertegen remmende maatregelen te noemen. Het is de veronderstelde machteloosheid door banken en politiek enerzijds en het groepsgedrag van de speculanten anderzijds dat niet alleen een hoge koersvlucht stimuleerd, maar ook een extra snelle neerwaartse spiraal ontsteekt.

Kun je je tegen een beurs crash indekken? Wellicht niet altijd, maar een waardevolle analyse die in het boek gegeven wordt is deze: zodra het aspect van toekomstige waardevermeerdering de enige (of hoofd)reden tot aanschaf van het bezit is verworden, dan is een hausse niet meer weg te denken. Dit maakt het boek ook weer erg actueel: werd de prijsstijging in de nederlandse huizenmarkt niet recentelijk nog als een belangrijke reden tot aanschaf genoemd? ( )

This is a very interesting, brief account of the stock market excesses that led to the great crash in 1929. He makes the point that speculators are betting only on the price rising, not on any intrinsic value of the stock, and details all of the very highly leveraged stock funds that were sold as equities, and contributed to the crash. A very acerbic wit, and very entertaining, as well. ( )

http://bactra.org/weblog/algae-2009-0... ( )

http://minervaria.wordpress.com/2009/... ( )

Not really sure to make of this short, sharp book. I enjoyed Galbraith's dry with but finished it not that much the wiser about the causes of the Great Crash. Effectively, he says it was just a typical bubble exacerbated creatly by the overuse of leverage.

A quick read, not hugely educations but very well-written. I'm pretty sure this is the only economic history book which has ever made me laugh out load. ( )

history doesnt necesarily repeat but man, it rhymes.....great comparison with todays financial crisis (unintended with a 1955 date of the book)

Galbraith wrote The Great Crash in 1954 and he notes in his introduction that every time it was about to go out-of-print a new speculative mania would come along and a new printing would issue. One expects that the 2008 version must be in the works.

Galbraith writes for the general audience, which means he not only leaves out most of the arcane details, but he also writes in an engaging style. Galbraith's view is that the great speculative boom that preceded the Great Crash was fueled by not by easy credit, but rather by a mindset that ignored risk and assumed that the market would go ever upwards - in short, a mania. The leverage that helped raise the market to unknown heights, particularly buying on the margin, also built in the means for the sudden collapse. Once the market nosed over, margin calls went out, some were met, many were not, and the market tumbled faster and farther. Galbraith demonstrates that many leaders held onto a `boundless optimism' long after any rational support for such a view had disappeared.

Galbraith's main focus is on the market speculation and its collapse, but he also takes the view that the stock market collapse did in fact contribute greatly to the cause of the Great Depression. Galbraith asserts that the economy was not in strong shape before the stock market collapse. He likens the Great Crash to `typhoon which blew out of lower Manhattan'. The crash in the market struck the rich especially hard and because wealth was so concentrated the subsequent shrinkage in spending and investment by the rich caused serious damage to the economy. While we have significant safeguards in place today that did not exist in the 1930's, we also once again have a concentration of income and wealth eerily comparable to the pre-depression era.

Highest recommendation. Well-written, well-argued, and timely (once again). Readers may also appreciate Galbraith's equally readable A Short History of Financial Euphoria (Whittle) ( )